Jamison Foser

The Democrats' real message problem

The Washington Post's Chris Cillizza has a post entitled "Democrats' message problem" that highlights a new NPR poll conducted by Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg and Republican pollster Glen Bolger. Cillizza argues that the poll "suggests that on the major issues of the day, the Democratic argument is trumped by the Republican one." I agree -- but that's simply because the Democratic argument, as tested by this poll, isn't very well conceived or written. 

Here's Cillizza:

The poll tested a variety of potential/likely messages on health care, the economy and financial reform for generic Republican and Democratic candidates in 70 of the most competitive House districts in the country -- 60 held by Democrats, 10 held by Republicans -- and consistently found that the GOP argument gained more traction with voters.

...

Let's look at the overall messages for each side tested by the two pollsters.

The Democratic message:

"The partisan wars go on in Washington, but I'm focused on the battle for regular people. I voted for tax cuts for middle class families and small businesses and companies that create American jobs and on tough Wall Street reform. They voted to let Wall Street keep the money and do what they want, keep tax breaks for big corporations that send jobs overseas. They bailed out the banks, left the country in debt and voted against helping the unemployed in the resulting crisis. People are under the financial gun, and I vote against earmarks and to control spending."

The Republican message:

"It's time for the Democrats to stop living in the past by blaming others for nearly ten percent unemployment and their runaway government spending. I am focused on the future. I was not part of the Republican Congress that spent too much, and my goal will be to stop the wasteful spending that has only gotten significantly worse with one party control of Washington. The Democrats are growing the size and scope of government, and it's hurting our economy. We need a check and balance to make sure Washington listens to the people, rather than just spend, spend, spend."

Presented with those two options, 39 percent of respondents in the 70 House districts tested said they agreed with the Democratic statement while 52 percent chose the Republican statement.

Looking at those two messages, I'm not at all surprised the Republican message tests better. 

First of all, look at the way each message begins. The Democratic message opens with pablum: "The partisan wars go on in Washington, but I'm focused on the battle for regular people." What does that even mean? It's process, and it has nothing to do with voters' lives. The Republican message, on the other hand, opens with a hard-hitting indictment of the Democrats: "It's time for the Democrats to stop living in the past by blaming others for nearly ten percent unemployment and their runaway government spending."

The second sentence of the Democratic message is rambling and confusing, with three ands and a grammatically-challenged ending ("I voted for tax cuts ... and on tough Wall Street reform.") The second Republican sentence is a simple declarative statement.

The third Democratic sentence pulls its punch, accusing the Republicans of voting to "let Wall Street keep the money and do what they want." That isn't much of a negative; it emphasizes the GOP's support for freedom. Rather than saying "keep the money and do what they want," it should stress that the GOP would let Wall Street do bad things. The third Republican sentence contains no such drawback: "wasteful spending that has only gotten significantly worse" is an unambiguous negative.

The Democratic message concludes with a nod to the financial strain many Americans face (good!) -- and a purported Democratic response to that strain that, well, isn't (bad!): "People are under the financial gun, and I vote against earmarks and to control spending." I suspect that few people who are "under the financial gun" are much comforted to learn of a vote against earmarks.

So, basically, the Republican message is well-written, direct, and forceful. The Democratic message is meandering, soft, confusing, and opens and closes with irrelevancies. It's no surprise the GOP message tests better.

But maybe you noticed something else about the Democratic message? Like ... its lack of a Democratic message? The two specific positive actions the paragraph conveys are voting for tax cuts and to limit spending. That's it. People are hurting, and I want to cut taxes and cut spending -- that's a Republican message. There's nothing about health care or unemployment benefits or jobs programs or anything else. Is it any great surprise that given a choice between a hard-hitting Republican message and a mealy-mouthed Republican-Lite message, respondents chose the former?

Here's Cillizza's assessment of the question and results:

The results run counter to the deeply held belief among some leading Democratic strategists that the best way to limit Democratic losses this fall is to simultaneously embrace the accomplishments of the 111th Congress while raising questions about the lack of Republican solutions to the major problems facing the country.

But the Democratic message didn't actually "embrace the accomplishments of the 111th Congress." It didn't give Democratic voters any reason to back it. Unsurprisingly, then, if you look at the full poll results, you see huge gaps in the percentage of voters who strongly favor each statement -- the 12-point advantage for the Republican message in Tier 1 districts is a 17-point advantage if you consider only those who strongly favor one of the messages. (If this message testing is indicative of the messages actual Democrats are delivering in these districts, it should be little surprise that one section of the poll memo is titled "Strong enthusiasm gap favors Republicans in Democratic districts.")

The Greenberg/Bolger poll (pdf) tested another set of messages, not mentioned in Cillizza's piece:

(DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE) might say, "They left America with rising bailouts, deficits and unemployment. So, I'm fighting for small business and the middle class, not the big guys. I helped get the biggest tax cut ever for the middle class, extended benefits and health insurance for the unemployed and passed tax credits for small business and clean energy to create new jobs here. And I'll make sure Wall Street pays back every penny and that the government reduces the deficit each year. We can't go back to policies that hurt the middle class."

(REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE) might say, "The bailouts failed. The stimulus failed. And the health care bill will cost too much money. Unemployment has skyrocketed since the Democrats started running Washington. We cannot grow the economy by growing government. The best way to revive the economy and create jobs is to reduce government spending and encourage businesses to create jobs. We need to stop burdening our children and grandchildren with Washington's reckless overspending. My top priority will be to bring down the deficit and work to create jobs, not kill jobs."

Again, I think the Republican message is simply better-written than the Democratic message, though the gap isn't as large this time. Again, the Republican message consists of short, clear, declarative sentences -- the longest is a straightforward 21 words: "The best way to revive the economy and create jobs is to reduce government spending and encourage businesses to create jobs." Compare that to the 35-word heart of the Democratic message: "I helped get the biggest tax cut ever for the middle class, extended benefits and health insurance for the unemployed and passed tax credits for small business and clean energy to create new jobs here."

Still, the Democratic message in this matched pair is much better-written than in the first one. And there's less pointless pablum. And this one actually includes some positives other than cutting spending and taxes -- extension of benefits & health insurance, for example. It gives Democratic voters something to applaud.

And, unsurprisingly, it tests better. Remember: In Tier 1 districts, the GOP message in the first pair had a 12-point advantage, and a 17-point advantage when looking only at people who strongly preferred one of the two statements. In the second pair, the Republican advantage drops to 9 points -- 8 points among those with a strong preference, less than half the advantage the GOP message had in the first pair.

That, obviously, is still not good for the Democrats. It does, however, lend some support to the notion that a clear, unambiguous, progressive message may be more effective than a muddled Republican-Lite message.

The poll also tests health care messages -- and, again, there is a striking qualitative difference between the messages as written. Take a look:

(DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE) might say, "Health reform isn't perfect, but it's a good start that puts an end to the worst abuses of the insurance companies. They want to change it so the insurance companies can deny people coverage because of pre-existing conditions and kick them off if they get sick. I'll keep working to make the law better by providing families and businesses more stable coverage and lower costs, not go back to the old way where insurance companies set the rules."

(REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE) might say, "At a cost of over one trillion dollars, the new health care law is increasing the cost of health care for middle class families, lowers the quality of care we receive, and will increase our taxes. This plan is little more than a government takeover of health care, giving government bureaucrats the power to make medical decisions. We need to change the new law by keeping the few good parts and significantly improving the rest."

The Democratic message begins and ends by criticizing the health care reform legislation is is theoretically touting. The Republican message clearly, consistently, and unambiguously slams the law. If the Democrats continually stipulate to their own flaws, is it really any surprise that the Republican message tests better?

Here's the good news for Democrats: the Republican message probably tests better than the Democratic message in part because it simply is better. It's better-conceived (it does not undermine itself the way the Democratic message does, nor does it give its own voters the cold shoulder) and better-written (direct, straightforward, strong declarative sentences.) Why is that good news? Because it suggests the Democrats have room for improvement. If this poll showed the same advantages for Republican messages against well-crafted Democratic messages, that would be bleak news for the Democrats.

The Sestak non-scandal, in a nutshell

Conservatives: "Rahm Emanuel ordered a turkey sandwich. That's a scandal!"

Media: "OMG!"

The White House: "Rahm Emanuel ordered a turkey sandwich. That isn't a scandal."

Media: "It's the White House's fault we were all, like, 'OMG!' They should have told us sooner that ordering a turkey sandwich isn't a scandal."

Conservatives: "They really expect us to think all they did was order a turkey sandwich? How stupid do they think we are? That's obviously a cover story."

Media: "Questions about sandwich order continue to linger."

DC's Emergency Alert System Needs Work

It seems whenever Washington, DC is about to get hit with a thunderstorm, I get a text message and an email alerting me to the oncoming storm from the DC government.  That's nice of them, though I could get the same information easily enough from a few dozen other sources.  It's weather, after all.

At 10:08 AM today, the DC government sent out an email alert warning residents of much of the city  not to use their water due to increased chlorine levels. Oddly, I got the email, but didn't get a text message. It seems like "Don't use your water, it isn't safe" is precisely the kind of message that they should send out via text -- certainly much more so than "It's going to rain tonight."

Even more odd: According to an 11:34 AM update at DCist, the DC government announced a modification of the affected area -- a modification that excludes my residence from the warning.  Yet DC never sent out either a text message or an email announcing the change.

Odder still: At 3:40 PM, DCist posted an entry indicating that the warning had been lifted.  It's 6:15 PM as I write this, and I have not gotten any such notification from DC.  And if you go to the DC government web site, there's no indication there ever was a warning.

So, it turns out I could have been using my water fro the past 6 or 7 hours, but DC -- which earlier sent an email telling me not to use my water -- never got around to letting me know.

And it turns out DC doesn't consider "your water isn't safe to drink" (or "OK, now your water IS safe to drink") important enough messages to merit the use of the text-message alert system they use whenever they expect a heavy rain.

This does not inspire confidence in the city's emergency preparedness. 

Lesson learned: DCist.com is more reliable than DC.gov when it comes to emergency situations.

UPDATE: I now have an email from the DC government canceling the warning; apparently it was sent at 4:15.  The fact that it took two hours to get to me is a pretty good indication that they should have sent a text message, too.

A note at the bottom of the 4:15 email reads "Sent by DC HSEMA to e-mail, pagers, cell phones .... powered by Cooper Notification RSAN." (Ellipsis in original) But I see no indication it actually was sent to cell phones -- I haven't gotten a text message. 

The 10:08 AM email advising DC residents not to use water includes this note: "Sent by DC HSEMA to e-mail....powered by Cooper Notification RSAN." (Ellipsis in original)  So that seems to suggest they didn't even try to send it to pagers or cell phones.

Health care, polling, and blind spots

Under the header “Democrats’ blind spot on health reform,” two longtime Democratic pollsters argue in the Washington Post that their party has a blind spot when it comes to the political peril in continuing to pursue comprehensive health care reform.  But in doing so, Pat Caddell and Doug Schoen actually demonstrate the blind spot they, like many Democratic political operatives, have when it comes to interpreting polling results.

First, Caddell and Schoen assume that opposition to comprehensive health care reform is set in stone -- a dubious assumption, particularly in light of the fact (ignored by the authors) that the public’s understanding of what is actually in the bill is imperfect, to say the least.  Caddell and Schoen then breezily dismiss the possibility that health care reform will turn out to be popular if it passes:

“The notion that once enactment is forced, the public will suddenly embrace health-care reform could not be further from the truth -- and is likely to become a rallying cry for disaffected Republicans, independents and, yes, Democrats.”

That’s quite a strawman, though: The argument is not that the public will “suddenly embrace health-care reform” as though a switch had been flipped.  It’s that if health care reform is effective, it will be popular.  It’s that the best way -- the only way in some cases -- to address concerns about health care reform is to just do it then show them that those concerns didn’t come true.  Caddell and Schoen don’t even address the possibility that in the months and years after it is signed into law, health care reform will become popular.

Caddell and Schoen could, I suppose, argue that they are concerned only with the very short term political implications of passing health care reform -- that they don’t care about the program’s long-term popularity, only about how it will affect this November’s elections.  If so, that’s the kind of myopia that results in Democrats constantly fighting policy and political battles on the Republicans’ turf.  When one party refuses to articulate a philosophical approach to government or to enact the policies they believe will be successful, it’s little wonder public debates tend to play out using the other party’s framing.

Nor do I accept the premise that passing health care reform will adversely affect the Democrats this November.  The assumption that it will is another blind spot Caddell and Schoen demonstrate: the failure to consider counterfactuals and the indirect ways in which the public reacts to political developments.

In order to conclude that passing health care reform is a political loser, you have to first assess what will happen if Democrats don’t pass reform, and then determine whether the consequences of passing reform are worse than the consequences of not passing reform.  But Caddell and Schoen give no indication that they have even considered how things play out if Democrats fail to pass reform.  Should Democrats fail to do so, they risk entering the November elections with a demoralized base and with a widespread perception that they are weak and ineffectual.  Does those negatives outweigh whatever negatives will result from passing reform?  I think they do -- but I’m certain that someone who doesn’t even consider the question has no business offering strategic advice.

And Caddell and Schoen approach the public opinion data in an overly literal way.  Polls show most people don’t like the reform package, so Caddell and Schoen conclude that people don’t like it, won’t like it, and won’t like Democrats if they pass it.  But that isn’t really how public opinion works.  For one thing, voters have imperfect knowledge about the bill.  Perhaps more importantly, Caddell and Schoen ignore the extent to which public opinion is driven by visceral, emotional reactions to politicians and their actions.  They ignore the possibility that if Democrats pass health care reform, they will be seen by a nervous and economically insecure public as having taken bold and decisive action.  They ignore the possibility that, in passing historic reforms they have sought for decades, Democrats will be perceived as both strong and principled.  They ignore the possibility that in walking away from a bill they spent a year on, declaring defeat despite controlling both the White House and large majorities in Congress, Democrats would look weak -- and that in doing so out of fear of electoral defeat, they would look unprincipled.

I happen to think all of those possibilities suggest that Democrats would be better off politically -- both this year and for years to come -- if they pass health care reform.  But that is by no means a certainty.  What is a certainty is that arguments that fail to consider those dynamics, instead relying on a one-dimensional and unduly-literal interpretation of polling and an assumption that it will remain static, simply should not be taken seriously.

To be clear: this is not a rejection of polling.  Used properly, polls are valuable tools that can inform a winning strategy.  But Caddell and Schoen make the all-to-common mistake of thinking polls are strategy -- that if people say they don’t like X, they don’t like X and never will and you must not to X.  That’s a remarkably unsophisticated use of polling, particularly coming from two such distinguished pollsters.

Caddell and Schoen are more convincing when arguing that the public holds broad anti-government attitudes, and that those attitudes argue against passing health care reform. (though they would be still more convincing if they discussed trend lines or the reasons for those attitudes.)

But if progressives believe the public is skeptical of government’s ability to do things that need doing without excessive infringement on individual liberty, they have three choices.  They can stipulate to the correctness of that skepticism and refrain from pursuing progressive government programs, in which case they may as well save everyone some time and find another line of work.  Or they can lay low and wait for public sentiment to magically change on its own.  Or they can show that the government is capable of doing good, by passing effective government programs.

Caddell and Schoen appear not to have considered that the public is skeptical of government because they have seen the government horribly mismanaged (think Hurricane Katrina) and perceive it to be more responsive to the needs of huge banks than to them.  People aren’t skeptical of government because they hate Social Security; they’re skeptical of government because they haven’t seen the government do anything like it lately.  Successful health care reform could do a lot to change that trend -- and give Democrats a key bragging point for decades to come.

And what do Caddell and Schoen suggest Democrats do instead of passing comprehensive heath insurance reform?  An incremental approach that, they insist “can win bipartisan support.”  They don’t specify by what magic they plan to convince significant numbers of congressional Republicans to hand Democrats an election-year win, but it seems painfully obvious that any proposal that garners such support will be entirely unimpressive.  Besides: If a significant number of Republican votes in Congress can be attained for modest health care initiatives, Democrats can always pursue that strategy next year if necessary.  This year is their only shot at comprehensive reform.

Finally, though not related to their strategic assessments, I should note that Caddell and Schoen seem to have forgotten that the point of running for office is doing good things while in office -- and that sometimes politicians should use polling to figure out how to do good things, not whether to do them.

Previously:

The politics of health care reform

There is no "reset" button

Garbage In, Garbage Out: Gallup’s reconciliation polling

A Gallup poll question finding that 52 percent of Americans oppose the use of reconciliation to pass health care legislation is getting a lot of attention from Republicans and the media.  It shouldn’t.  

The Gallup question asked respondents how they would feel about “Democrats in Senate using a parliamentary procedure to avoid a Republican filibuster and pass healthcare bill by simple majority vote.”

At best, that means exactly nothing to most people.  Worse, it sounds devious.  “Using a parliamentary procedure to avoid” makes it seem like some sort of unprecedented trick (it isn't.)  No wonder people oppose it.

Another problem: The question suggests the entire health care reform package would be passed using this trickery.  In fact, reconciliation is generally being considered as a means of passing tweaks to the legislation that has already passed the Senate with 60 votes.

The results would, I suspect, be far different if Gallup asked a much more straightforward question: “Do you think passage of health care legislation should be decided by majority vote?” Or even the more-accurate-but-slightly-more-complicated: “Do you think passage of changes to the recently-passed health care legislation should be decided by majority vote?”

UPDATE: As I noted on The Twitter, if you ask people if they like "“heated ground bovine flesh,” the results will be significantly less reliable than if you ask them about "hamburger." Keep it simple!

Ken Starr is not here to talk about the past

ABC's George Stephanopoulos asks Ken Starr why Monica Lewinsky wasn't allowed to call a lawyer, noting that Justice Department official blasted Starr's treatment of her. Unable to defend his conduct, Starr ducks the question completely: "These are issues from the past." Stephanopoulos politely moves on.

Stephanopoulos: The most serious charge seems to be his conclusions about the questioning of Monica Lewinsky ... He talks about a Justice Department investigation that was led by Jo Ann Harris, and she seems to take great issue with the fact that Monica Lewinsky was not allowed to call her lawyer, was dissuaded from calling her lawyer during the questioning.  She said in the book “I wouldn’t have touched her [Lewinsky] with a 10 foot poll. The minute she says ‘Can I call my lawyer?’ you stop. And when she says it for the sixth or seventh time, you really stop.”  Why wasn’t she allowed to call her lawyer?

Starr: Well, again, George, these are issues from the past.  And, again, you have a very thoughtful examination by Ken Gormley, and you know, there was a very unhappy chapter in the nation’s history.  And of course, specific tactics can be questioned, and should be questioned.  Power should be accounted for, the use of power should be accounted for.  So I accept thoughtful criticisms, and I think Ken’s book is a useful service to the country.

Stephanopoulos: Do you think you’ll ever write about it?

In short: Starr is still a loathsome little creep after all these years.

There is no "reset" button

There has been a lot of talk -- coming from both reporters and professional Democrats -- since Scott Brown's win in Massachusetts of President Obama and the Democrats pressing the "reset button."

There is no "reset" button.

Pressing the reset button suggests starting over.  Democrats cannot start over; they must continue from where they are.  They must figure out not what they should have been doing all along, but rather what they must do from here.

For example: Let's say you think they shouldn't have pursued health care last year.  Ok, fine.  But they did.  They can't simply push a "reset" button now; they did what they did, and must proceed from here.  That does not mean that they have to continue on the same course, or that they have to pass comprehensive health care reform (though I think they do.)  What it means is that they have to keep in mind how their actions going forward will work given what they have already done, not in some fantasy world in which they are starting over via a reset button.

Politics isn't Super Mario Brothers.  You can change course, but you don't get to hit a button and get a clean slate.

Politico's (wrong) lessons of Clinton's comeback

Politico's John Harris has a piece explaining various "lessons" of Bill Clinton's post-1994 political comeback that President Obama should learn from.  Like countless reporters who have attempted to summarize Clinton's comeback over the years, Harris places a great deal of weight on things like "Triangulation" and small-bore initiatives like school uniforms -- "Understand that small things can be big," as Harris puts it.

But Harris -- like many before him -- bizarrely omits two of the most important elements of Clinton's comeback.

First, the economy was stronger -- and the perception of the economy was much stronger -- in '95/'96 than in '93/'94. For example: The unemployment rate ranged from 6.5 percent to 7.3 percent for all of Clinton's first year in office.  It was in steady decline throughout 1994, but didn't fall below 6 percent until just before the November elections.  By the 1996 election, the unemployment rate had been in the mid 5s for two full years.

Harris writes that a key lesson of Clinton's comeback is to "Find a way to talk about the economy."  Strangely, he makes no mention of a more important lesson: Find a way to fix the economy.  Indeed, he ignores the concept that actual economic conditions have something to do with electoral results.

And Harris gives no indication that he understands that an incumbent can better get away with running on small-scale initiatives like school uniforms when the economy is good than when unemployment is hovering around 10 percent.

Second, Harris seems to have forgotten that a key feature of Clinton's comeback was an aggressive and successful campaign to highlight the opposition party's deeply unpopular agenda.  The GOP shut down the government, tried to slash Medicare, attempted to roll back environmental protections that had enjoyed decades of bipartisan support, and more. 

Revisionist histories of the Clinton Comeback tend to focus on, as Harris does, "Triangulation," as though that meant that the Clinton team didn't hammer the GOP relentlessly:

Clinton became famous for what his political consultant Dick Morris called “triangulation,” positioning himself between liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans.
...
Under the Clinton formula, Obama would never surrender an aura of bipartisanship — no matter how bitterly partisan Washington becomes.

The reality is that Clinton and the Democrats spent 1995 and 1996 beating Republicans over the head for their draconian policy initiatives, ethical lapses, and willingness to stand in the same room as Newt Gingrich. 

Take a look at this 1996 ad, titled "Wrong in the Past":

Does that look like an attempt to blur lines, appear bipartisan, and run on uncontroversial small-bore initiatives?

Harris's "lessons" of Clinton's comeback have a couple of problems: They are far from a full picture of  what really happened, and they ignore the massive economic differences between 1995/96 and 2010. Other than that, though: Great advice.

The politics of health care reform

David Plouffe has some good advice for Democrats:

Pass a meaningful health insurance reform package without delay. Americans' health and our nation's long-term fiscal health depend on it. I know that the short-term politics are bad. It's a good plan that's become a demonized caricature. But politically speaking, if we do not pass it, the GOP will continue attacking the plan as if we did anyway, and voters will have no ability to measure its upside. If we do pass it, dozens of protections and benefits take effect this year. ... Only if the plan becomes law will the American people see that all the scary things Sarah Palin and others have predicted -- such as the so-called death panels -- were baseless. We own the bill and the health-care votes. We need to get some of the upside. (P.S.: Health care is a jobs creator.)

Plouffe’s broad points are both exactly right and, unfortunately, infrequently understood by professional Democrats -- and not just in terms of the current health care discussions. (They’re also a pretty good reminder that comprehensive health care reform should have been passed quickly last year.)

But Plouffe’s stipulation that the “short-term politics are bad” concedes too much to skittish Democrats and media naysayers.  That stipulation was nothing more than a throw-away in Plouffe’s piece, but it’s a common assumption, so it’s worth considering whether it’s true.

I don’t think it is.

Let’s say Democrats were to pass a robust health care reform package next week.  What, exactly, is the downside?  As Plouffe notes, the downsides are already in place, and they aren’t going away.  Are they really likely to get much worse?  That seems unlikely -- particularly considering the (comparatively, at least) favorable coverage they’d get for accomplishing a legislative goal they’ve sought for decades.

But that’s only half of the equation. When you say “the short-term politics are bad,” you have to consider: Compared to what?

In this case, that’s compared to not passing health care reform.  And that, I think, would be politically devastating for Democrats.  Remember: the downsides are locked in place.  Republicans aren’t going to stop hitting Democrats for supporting health care reform; the GOP base isn’t going to become demoralized by Democrats walking away from reform; etc.  And by walking away from health care reform they’ve been working on for a year and talking about for decades, Democrats will also look like they aren’t capable of governing and don’t stand by their core values.  They’ll face weeks of news reports -- not to mention Republicans -- portraying them as weak and craven on top of the negatives they already face.

Compared to not passing health care reform, passing health care reform is a political winner, not a loser -- in both the short and the long term.

(My current column for Media Matters is about a related topic: the shallowness of the media's political analysis, one example of which is a tendency to assess the political merits of a situation without considering the political merits of the alternatives.)

UPDATE: Mike Lux explains what passing "a meaningful health insurance reform package" means:

The path, which has been suggested by many other people as well as me, is to simply pass the full Senate bill, and then immediately pass a clean-up bill through the reconciliation process, which requires only 51 votes in the Senate. The clean-up bill could include the provisions that progressives in the House and Senate, as well as wide majorities of the American people, have been demanding: the compromise on the benefits tax issue, more affordability for low and moderate income folks, ending insurers' exemption from anti-trust laws, a national insurance exchange instead of the weaker fragmented state run exchanges, and yes, some form of that public option that voters and activists keep saying we want. Doing this kind of double bill approach would allow all the good insurance regulations and other provisions in both the Senate and House versions of the bill that can't be passed through the reconciliation process because of Senate rules to still get done, while making the bill far more politically popular with voters and healing the rifts caused with the base because of all the bad compromises forced by Lieberman and other Democratic conservatives in the Senate.